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1 Introduction
A well-established fact in monetary theory states that cash-in-advance mo-
dels tend to display sunspot equilibria for weak degrees of intertemporal
substitution (see for example Farmer (1999) in a model with a constant
money supply rule). This sort of real indeterminacy gives way for ma
croeconomic instability to be generated by self-fulfilling beliefs. People's
non-fundamental expectations - i.e. beliefs that share no relation to the
economy's fundamentals - can affect allocations. The présent paper iden
tifies versions of the Taylor interest rate rule that are able to pre-empt
thèse self-fulfilling equilibria. In particular, I show that if the central bank
adjusts the short-run nominal interest rate exclusively and passively with
respect to future inflation, then sunspots do not matter for any parameter
values of relative risk aversion. Phrased alternatively. the enigma of insta
bility caused by certain degrees of risk aversion is completely elimiiiated
by a pure inflation-targeting. However, if output-targeting becomes an is
sue, then the Taylor rule's timing becomes crucial in deciding how to set
the policy parameters. Forward-looking rules generate instability whenever
output-targeting is strong. A strong output-targeting is at place when the
rule is backward-looking. I also demonstrate that current-looking policies -
that is rules in which interest rates rnove with current-period variables -
always produce indeterminacy. Lastly. I dérive observationally équivalent
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formulations of Taylor interest rules and money growth rules : indetermi-
nacy is not the resuit of simple nominal money supply rules.
The arguments which are developed in the current paper are framed
within a fully specified cash-in-advance environment. It is related to Carl-
strom and Fuerst's (2000) analysis of timing-aspects of interest rate rules.
My paper differs from theirs in three key aspects, however. First, they limit
the analysis to logarithmic utility : préférences alone do not induce multipli-
city. Second, in their model the central bank's nominal interest rate targets
inflation only. The current paper considers versions of the original Taylor
rule in which the interest rate is increased or decreased according to what is
happening to both aggregate output and inflation. Furthermore, I présent
new results on interest smoothing. My work hère also shares similarities
with Christiano (2000) and Weder (2003) who introduce non-fundamental
instability through increasing returns in otherwise standard cash-in-advance
économies. They show that certain Taylor rules are able to tax away scale
économies and, as a conséquence, multiple equilibria disappear.
2 The artifîcial economy
The model is a dynamic gênerai equilibrium economy. It is populated by
immortal, atomistic households of measure one. Money is introduced by
imposing a cash-in-advance constraint on goods purchases. Ail markets are
perfectly compétitive and priées are perfectly flexible. There is no physical
capital in the economy - an assumption that is simply made to obtain ana-
lytical results.1 The baseline spécification considers forward-looking Taylor
policies : the central bank targets short-run interest rates in response to ex-
pected variables. Rules that involve différent timings, i.e. current-looking
or backward-looking policies, are presented in Section 4. Overall, they tell
similar stories.
2.1 Préférences and technology
The représentative agent's préférences order over an infinité séquence of
consumption, ct, and labor, ht. Lifetime utility is captured by the discounted
value of the utility stream :
f.=0
1 The occurence of sunspot equilibria in CIA models does not arise Irom the absence of capital (see also
Carlstrom and Fuerst's (2000) for équivalence results).Mark Weder 197
where (5 is the discount factor and Eo stands for the rational expectations




Hère, the relative risk-aversion coefficient is denoted by a.
Labor is supplied on compétitive markets. Wt stands for the nominal
wage. In period t people can invest into a single risk-free asset, bt> bearing
a gross one-period rate of return Rt. Alternatively, the agents can set aside
cash, mt+i. The agent's budget constraint is given by
PtCt +h + mt+i ^ Wtht + Rt-ibt-i + rnt + Nt
where Pt dénotes the price level and Nt is the current period's cash transfer
from the central bank.
Money holdings are strictly positive since consumption purchases re-
quire cash. The cash-in-advance constraint
Ptct ^mt+Nt + i^-i&t-i - bt
states that period t nominal consumption purchases must be covered by the
agents' cash holdings. I assume that the asset market opens first : consump
tion trading is carried out after retuming from the financial market and
after the current period's cash transfer from the central bank is received.
There is no physical capital in this economy; the production techno-
logy is given by
yt = Aht A> 0.
The final good can only be used for consumption purposes.
2.2 Policy
The central bank's operating target, Ru is set based on the state of ma-
croeconomic variables of the economy. In the baseline spécification, I assume
that the central bank is forward-looking. The target's movements are syn-
chronized to expected values of inflation and aggregate output :
Rt = TjEtnt+i + TEtyt+i 7] > 0, r ^ 0. (1)
Carets dénote percentage déviations of variables frorn their stationary state;
in a sensé, yt+i can be interpreted as the output gap. Policies that involve
r) > 1 (r] < 1) are said to be actively (passively) targeting inflation. Policies
that set r > 1 (r < 1) are active (passive) output-targeting rules. Mo
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goods ; any potential seigniorage income is distributed back in lump-sum
fashion and does not affect allocations at the margin.
3 Equilibrium dynamics
In symmetric equilibrium, yt = Aht = Ct and Mf = mt must hold for Vf.
The artificial economy boils down to
and
A0Et<Ç+i =
plus monetary policy (1). Taking a first-order Taylor séries approximation
around the unique steady state leads to the following linear functional équa
tion
Etct+1 = ct (2)
7)<J — T
from which the dynamic properties of the economy can be traced. Real de-
terminacy requires that > 1. If this condition is fulfilled, the model
■qa-T
uniquely pins down the séquence of current and future consumption reali-
zations and non-fundamental noise does not play any rôle. Otherwise, i.e. if
the condition is violated, the rational expectations solution includes
o~ , <y
ct + (ct+i - Etct+i) = ct + st+i
r)cr t
t (t+i tt+i)
r]G - r r)cr — t
in which i.i.d. shocks to expectations, st+i, influence real allocations.
Let us compare the présent model to one with an alternative policy :
money supply grows at an exogenous rate. Then, the reduced-form dynamics
are given by (see Farmer, 1999, or Weder, 2004)
Etct+i = ct (3)
1 — (T
and sunspot equilibria arise for a > 2. Consequently, an observational équi
valence exists between a constant money growth rule and a forward-looking
Taylor policy that sets rj* = 1 — a + r/a which can easily be seen by com-
paring (2) and (3).
Next, I will analyze the dynamic implications of Taylor policies -
other than rf - with the goal of identifying parameter constellations in
which the mdeterminacy disappears. I will begin with the spécial case of
pure inflation-targeting.Mark Weder 199
3.1 Inflation-targeting
If the central bank targets inflation only, i.e. r = 0, the following result
applies : the term that describes relative risk vanishes and. unlike the case
of (exogenous) money-growth policies, the degree of relative risk has no
effect on the equilibrium dynamics.
However, indeterminacy is still a possibility. A passive (active) infla
tion-targeting is sufficient for determinacy (indeterminacy). The économies
behind the resuit are easily nnderstood.2 If t] > 1, the nominal rate and the
real interest rate, rt, move in the same direction since
n = - Rt-
v
Now, suppose that people increase current consumption - unrelated to any
changes in the economy's fundamentals. The consumption surge lowers the
real rate as well as the nominal rate. Since the nominal rate is équivalent to
a distortion in a cash-in-advance economy, the lower rate is compatible with
the initial beliefs. The sunspots cycle is completed. If r/ < 1, the influence of
sunspot expectations remains impossible since déviations from the steady
state would violate first-order conditions.
3.2 Output-targeting
Let us turn to a pure output-targeting. The dynamics of the economy are
given by
r
Unlike the pure inflation-targeting, the elasticity of intertemporal substitu
tion has a first degree influence on the effect of the monetary policy. Inde
terminacy arises for r > a : a sufficiently weak output-targeting éliminâtes
sunspot equilibria. The following séquence of events depicts the économie
reasoning. Assume a belief-driven increase of today's consumption. The ex-
pected inflation rate falls. The next period's consurnption purchases décline.
The new allocation can only be supported as long as today's nominal rate
falls. It falls since the drop in future output feeds back into today's nominal
rate which will décline. Thus, the initial beliefs are afnrmed.
It is noteworthy mentioning that ceteiis paribus sunspot equilibria
arise for relatively small values of a. This circumvents the resuit obtained
in models with a constant nioney supply rule in which it was low elasticities
of intertemporal substitution that lead to multiplicity (see Farmer (1999)).
I will show below that tins result on macroeconomic stabilization does not
2 Since a drops from (2), the spécial case of a pure inflation-targeting is, of course, indirectly known from
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dépend on the use of interest rate rules versus money growth rules. The
etfect is determined by the tirning in the policy function under pure output-
targeting. For example, Section 4.2. will demonstrate that when the policy is
backward-looking, then large elasticities of intertemporal substitution lead
to multiplicity.
3.3 Output- and inflation-targeting
Next I will consider the gênerai policy formulation of équation (1). Indeter-
minacy arises for
a < r/(l + r/) or a > rj{i) - 1).
The second condition, of course, requires that r/ > 1. Thus, there is one
sunspot zone which can be excluded by passively targeting future-inflation
as in Section 3.1. The other zone involves low values of the relative risk-
aversion parameter. To comprehend my argument's gênerai plausibility, I
will turn to a nurnerical example. Let us assume that the central bank
follows the Taylor-principle and, in particular, it sets r/ = 1.53 and r = 0.77
which are Taylor's (1999) estimâtes for the Fédéral Reserve Bank's policy
for the 1987-1997 period.3 Given Taylor's estimâtes, determinacy arises for
the parametric région 0.31 < a < 1.45.4 Bearing in mind the often used
logarithmic period-utility, i.e. a = 1, one is inclined to conclude that the
Taylor-principle is an appropriate policy. However, a may well be located
outside the determinacy région. For example, Hansen and Singleton (1983)
suggest that the coefficient of relative risk is between zéro and two. Thus,
information on the true value of a is a pre-requisite for policy advice.
The pre-1980-period is often thought of as having been subject to
expectational instability created by the Fédéral Reserve (see for example
Clarida et al. (2000)). Taylor (1999) estimâtes for the 1960-1979 period are
?/ = 0.88 and r = 0.25. The less than one-for-one weight on inflation is
confirmed by other studies (e.g. Clarida et al. (2000)). Now, indeterminacy
requires very low and likely unreasonable values of relative risk aversion,
i.e. a < 0.13. In other words, only the first of the above sunspot conditions
binds. Given my results. the Fédéral Réservées pre-1980 policy may hâve
been a suitable choice in stabilizing expectational fluctuations.
3 Of course, the current economy is likely too simple to take thèse parameter values at face value. However,
the empirical literature has not produced clear point estimations : the estimation uncertainty of the policy-
estimates is perhaps as large as the variance of er-estimates. Thus, my discussion's main intend is to
demonstrate that policies that are approximately similar to the observed policies are not able to eliminate
sunspots.
4 Note that the results do not dépend on the absence of physical capital. For example, in a extension of this
model with capital and a Cobb-Douglas technology, the régime shifts at a = 1.45 as well if the capital share
is 0.42, 0 = 0.99, and the capital dépréciation rate is 2.5 percent per quarter. Put alternatively, the current
paper does not consider physical capital simply to générale analytical results.Mark Weder 201
4 Other versions of the Taylor rule
This Section présents various extension of the above results. I will begin with
the discussion of hybrid iules. This is followed by an analysis of interest
smoothing. I will then présent results on current-looking and backward-
looking versions of the Taylor rule.
4.1 Hybrid Taylor rules
Let us suppose that the central bank's policy is guided by the hybrid rule
Rt = riEtn+i +rYt 7/ ^ 0, r ^ 0
in which the central bank's operating target is a function of the current
output gap. The linear model takes the form
Etct+i = — + — )ct
and determinacy arises if rja > 77 — 1. This condition implies that the es-
timated 1987-1997 Taylor parameters - 77 = 1.53 and r = 0.77 - require
that a > 1.45. The uncertainty about the true value of relative risk aversion
implies that the current model cannot answer the question if the Fédéral
Reserve Bank's policy was able to eliminate sunspots. However, if 77 < 1
(as in line with pre-1980 estimâtes) then a clear-cut answer is possible. The
inequality together with the sign-restrictions on the parameters finds that
a hybrid rule that is passive with respect to inflation always produces inde-
terminacy. In a sensé, by reacting to current output - and not to expected
output as in Section 3 - the central bank is able to react to both key ma-
croeconomic variables while ruling out indeterminacy at the same time.
4.2 Interest rate smoothing
Giannoni and Woodford (2002) hâve suggested that backward-looking Tay
lor rules' performances can be improved by adding lagged values of the
nominal interest rate. In particular, they consider rules like
Rt = pRt-i + TiEt7Tt+i + rYt p > 0, 7] ^ 0, r ^ 0 (4)
and find that. a smoothing coefficient, p. greater than one guarantees uni
que equilibria. The présent economy can be approximated by the following
équation
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Indeterminacy translates into 1/ct < (r) + p- 1)/t. A large smoothing coef
ficient does not guarantee uniqueness, quite on the contrary, it increases the
indeterminacy space. The Clarida et al. (2000) estimâtes for the pre- and
post-Volcker period of the coefficients in équation (4) imply that sunspots
arise for a > 0.53 (and a > 0.47).
4.3 Current-looking rules
Let us now formulate the policy
Rt = rfnt + TYt r) ^ 0, r ^ 0
in which the central bank tunes the short-run rate following movements in
the currently observed variables. The dynamics of the economy transform
into the scalar équation
(r - (1 + r})a)Etct+1 = 0.
Tins équation pins down ct+j\/j > 0, however, the initial consumption level
is free : real indeterminacy applies for any policy parameter and any degree
of relative risk. The finding that current-looking Taylor rules always imply
indeterminacy is reminiscent of Carlstrom and Fuerst's (2000) and Weder's
(2003) flexible price models which include endogenous investment.
4.4 Backward-looking rules
Lastly, I consider a monetary policy that is conducted so as to insure that
the nominal rate of interest satisfies
Rt = TjTTt-i + rYt-i rj^O, r ^ 0.
This rule implies the following dynamics of the economy :
ar]~TCf. (6)
a
It is easy to see that there exists an observationally équivalent formulation to
an exogenous money growth-policy : the model reduces to (3) if the central
bank fixes the Taylor parameters such that r/* = 1/(1 — a) + r/a.
A unique solution to (6) exists for
r r .„.
a < —— or a> (7)
1 +tj ri - 1
where the second condition only holds for a policy that aggressively works
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ones found for forward-looking rules. This is also reportée! by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2000) who, howevor, only consider the spécial case a = 1 and
r = 0. Given Taylor's post-1979 parameters, i.e. ^ = 1.53 and r = 0.77,
determinacy arises for a < 0.31 and a > 1.45. In particular, the economy is
indeterminate when period-utility is logarithinic in consumption.
Let us consider two spécial cases of the backward-looking policy. A
purely aggressive inflation-targeting delivers a sunspot-free world and the
degree of relative risk does not influence macroeconomic dynamics. On the
other hand, strong output-targeting is a strategy that insulates the economy
from endogenous cycles. Again, policy implications are fiipped on their head
when moving from forward-looking to backward-looking rules.
As of late, the Taylor rule debate lias advised the monetary autho-
rity to assign aggressive configurations of the policy in which interest rates
respond to predetermined variables (see for example Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1999) and Benhabib et al. (2003)). The current paper challenges that view.
Admittedly, the proposai leads to determinacy when the central bank reacts
aggressively to past inflation only. Nevertheless, gênerai recommendations
for aggressive policies are limited to a certain parametric région. Knowledge
of the true value of a is central for submitting concrète policy proposais.
5 Summary
Recently it lias become fashionable to formulate monetary policy in the
form of Taylor rules, i.e. it is assumed that the central bank sets the short-
run nominal interest rate in response to macroeconomic variables. The main
insight that émerges from the présent paper is that Taylor-based monetary
policy may be used to eliminate a well-specified source of macroeconomic
instability. This is shown within a model in which indeterminacy arises
from préférences, i.e. frorn the intertemporal substitution motive in cash-in-
advance économies. However, spécifie recommendations for monetary policy
dépend on the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, knowledge of the
true value of <r remains central before concrète policy proposais cari be made.
There are only two policies that solve the complète problem : determinacy
arises independently of a if the central bank either reacts exclusively to
aggressively to past inflation or exclusively passively to expected future
inflation.204 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 72(2), 2006
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